Attractor-like Dynamics in Belief Updating in Schizophrenia by Adams, Rick et al.
Attractor-like dynamics in belief 1	
updating in schizophrenia 2	
	3	 	4	 Rick	A	Adams1,2*†,	Gary	Napier1†,	Jonathan	P	Roiser1,	Christoph	Mathys3,4,5¶,	5	 James	Gilleen6,7¶	6	 	7	 1Institute	of	Cognitive	Neuroscience,	UCL,	17	Queen	Square,	London,	WC1N	3AZ,	8	 UK	9	 2Division	of	Psychiatry,	UCL,	6th	floor,	149	Tottenham	Court	Road,	London,	W1T	10	 7NF,	UK	11	 3Scuola	Internazionale	Superiore	di	Studi	Avanzati	(SISSA),	Via	Bonomea	265,	12	 34136	Trieste,	Italy	13	 4Translational	Neuromodeling	Unit	(TNU),	Institute	for	Biomedical	Engineering,	14	 University	of	Zurich	and	ETH	Zurich,	Wilfriedstrasse	6,	8032	Zurich,	Switzerland	15	 5Max	Planck	UCL	Centre	for	Computational	Psychiatry	and	Ageing	Research,	10-16	 12	Russell	Square,	London,	WC1B	5EH,	UK	17	 6Department	of	Psychology,	University	of	Roehampton,	London,	SE15	4JD.	18	 7Department	of	Psychosis	Studies;	Institute	of	Psychiatry,	Psychology	and	19	 Neuroscience,	Kings	College	London,	London,	SE5	8AF.	20	 †equal	contribution	21	 ¶joint	senior	authors	22	 	23	 *corresponding	author:	24	 rick.adams@ucl.ac.uk		25	 	26	 Key	words:	schizophrenia;	psychosis;	Bayesian;	disconfirmatory	bias;	beads	task;	27	 attractor	model		28	 	29	 Abstract	word	count:	247	words		30	 Introduction	word	count:	610	words	31	
Discussion	word	count:	1500	32	 3	Tables,	10	Figures	33	
Abstract 34	
	35	 Subjects	with	a	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	(Scz)	overweight	unexpected	36	 evidence	in	probabilistic	inference:	such	evidence	becomes	‘aberrantly	salient’.	A	37	 neurobiological	explanation	for	this	effect	is	that	diminished	synaptic	gain	(e.g.	38	 hypofunction	of	cortical	N-methyl-D-aspartate	receptors)	in	Scz	destabilizes	39	 quasi-stable	neuronal	network	states	(or	‘attractors’).	This	attractor	instability	40	 account	predicts	that	i)	Scz	would	overweight	unexpected	evidence	but	41	 underweight	consistent	evidence,	ii)	belief	updating	would	be	more	vulnerable	42	 to	stochastic	fluctuations	in	neural	activity,	and	iii)	these	effects	would	correlate.		43	 	44	 Hierarchical	Bayesian	belief	updating	models	were	tested	in	two	independent	45	 datasets	(n=80	and	n=167,	male	and	female)	comprising	human	subjects	with	46	 schizophrenia,	and	both	clinical	and	non-clinical	controls	(some	tested	when	47	 unwell	and	on	recovery)	performing	the	‘probability	estimates’	version	of	the	48	 beads	task	(a	probabilistic	inference	task).	Models	with	a	standard	learning	rate,	49	 or	including	a	parameter	increasing	updating	to	‘disconfirmatory	evidence’,	or	a	50	 parameter	encoding	belief	instability	were	formally	compared.	51	 	52	 The	‘belief	instability’	model	(based	on	the	principles	of	attractor	dynamics)	had	53	 most	evidence	in	all	groups	in	both	datasets.	Two	of	four	parameters	differed	54	 between	Scz	and	non-clinical	controls	in	each	dataset:	belief	instability	and	55	
response	stochasticity.	These	parameters	correlated	in	both	datasets.	56	 Furthermore,	the	clinical	controls	showed	similar	parameter	distributions	to	Scz	57	 when	unwell,	but	were	no	different	to	controls	once	recovered.		58	 	59	 These	findings	are	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	attractor	network	60	 instability	contributes	to	belief	updating	abnormalities	in	Scz,	and	suggest	that	61	 similar	changes	may	exist	during	acute	illness	in	other	psychiatric	conditions.			62	 	63	
Significance Statement 64	 	65	 	66	 Subjects	with	a	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	(Scz)	make	large	adjustments	to	their	67	 beliefs	following	unexpected	evidence,	but	also	smaller	adjustments	than	68	 controls	following	consistent	evidence.	This	has	previously	been	construed	as	a	69	 bias	towards	‘disconfirmatory’	information,	but	a	more	mechanistic	explanation	70	 may	be	that	in	Scz,	neural	firing	patterns	(‘attractor	states’)	are	less	stable	and	71	 hence	easily	altered	in	response	to	both	new	evidence	and	stochastic	neural	72	 firing.	We	model	belief	updating	in	Scz	and	controls	in	two	independent	datasets	73	 using	a	hierarchical	Bayesian	model,	and	show	that	all	subjects	are	best	fit	by	a	74	 model	containing	a	belief	instability	parameter.	Both	this	and	a	response	75	 stochasticity	parameter	are	consistently	altered	in	Scz,	as	the	unstable	attractor	76	 hypothesis	predicts.	77	
 78	
Introduction 79	 	80	 	81	 Subjects	with	a	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	(Scz)	tend	to	use	less	evidence	to	82	 make	decisions	in	probabilistic	tasks	than	healthy	controls	(Garety	et	al.,	1991;	83	 Dudley	et	al.,	2016).	The	paradigm	most	commonly	used	to	demonstrate	this	84	 effect	is	the	‘beads’	or	‘urn’	task,	in	which	subjects	are	shown	two	urns,	each	85	 containing	opposite	ratios	of	coloured	beads	(e.g.	85%	blue	and	15%	red	and	86	 vice	versa),	which	are	then	hidden.	A	sequence	of	beads	is	then	drawn	(with	87	 replacement)	from	one	urn,	and	the	subject	either	has	to	stop	the	sequence	when	88	 they	are	sure	which	urn	it	is	coming	from	(the	‘draws	to	decision’	task)	or	the	89	 subject	must	rate	the	probability	of	the	sequence	coming	from	either	urn	after	90	 seeing	each	bead,	without	having	to	make	any	decision	(the	‘probability	91	 estimates’	task).	Bayesian	analysis	of	these	tasks	has	indicated	that	Scz	are	more	92	 stochastic	in	their	responding	(Moutoussis	et	al.,	2011)	and	that	they	overweight	93	 recent	evidence	and	thus	update	their	beliefs	(in	the	probabilistic	sense)	more	94	 rapidly	(Jardri	et	al.,	2017).					95	 Several	belief-updating	abnormalities	have	been	found	in	Scz	using	the	96	 ‘probability	estimates’	task.	The	most	consistent	finding	is	that	Scz	(or	just	Scz	97	 with	delusions	(Moritz	and	Woodward,	2005))	change	their	beliefs	more	than	98	 non-psychiatric	controls	in	response	to	changes	in	evidence	(Langdon	et	al.,	99	 2010)	–	particularly	‘disconfirmatory’	evidence,	i.e.	evidence	contradicting	a	100	 current	belief	(Garety	et	al.,	1991;	Fear	and	Healy,	1997;	Young	and	Bentall,	101	
1997;	Peters	and	Garety,	2006).	Another	is	that	probability	ratings	at	the	start	of	102	 the	sequence	are	higher	in	currently	psychotic	(but	not	in	recovered)	Scz	than	in	103	 both	clinical	and	healthy	controls	(Peters	and	Garety,	2006),	similar	to	the	104	 ‘jumping	to	conclusions’	bias	in	the	‘draws	to	decision’	version	of	the	task.	Others	105	 have	also	found	that	Scz	update	less	than	controls	to	more	consistent	evidence,	in	106	 this	(Horga,	in	preparation)	and	other	paradigms	(Averbeck	et	al.,	2010).		107	 These	findings	can	potentially	be	understood	in	the	light	of	the	‘unstable	108	 attractor	network’	hypothesis	of	Scz.	An	attractor	network	is	a	neural	network	109	 that	can	occupy	numerous	stable	states	that	are	learned	from	experience,	via	110	 adjustments	to	synaptic	weights.	It	can	revisit	these	states	if	presented	with	111	 inputs	that	resemble	previous	patterns	of	synaptic	weights,	or	through	112	 spontaneous	fluctuations	in	neural	activity:	either	way,	the	activity	of	all	nodes	is	113	 ‘attracted’	to	a	quasi-stable	state	because	the	network	energy	is	lower	at	these	114	 states,	and	network	firing	patterns	evolve	to	minimise	energy.	Attractor	115	 networks	were	originally	developed	to	model	the	storage	and	reactivation	of	116	 memories	(Hopfield,	1982),	but	related	network	models	also	offer	mechanistic	117	 explanations	for	working	memory	storage	(e.g.	Brunel	and	Wang,	2001),	118	 decision-making	(Wang,	2013)	and	interval	timing	(Standage	et	al.,	2013),	as	119	 well	as	Bayesian	belief	updating	(Gepperth	and	Lefort,	2016).	120	 In	Scz,	attractor	states	in	prefrontal	cortex	are	thought	to	be	less	stable,	so	121	 it	is	easier	for	the	network	to	switch	between	them,	but	harder	to	become	more	122	 confident	about	(i.e.	increase	the	stability	of)	any	particular	one	(Rolls	et	al.,	123	 2008).	This	loss	of	stable	neuronal	states	–	recently	demonstrated	in	two	animal	124	 models	of	Scz	(Hamm	et	al.,	2017)	–	is	thought	to	be	due	to	hypofunction	of	N-125	 methyl-D-aspartate	receptors	(NMDARs)	or	cortical	dopamine	1	receptors	in	Scz	126	
(Figure	1).	Interestingly,	healthy	volunteers	given	ketamine	(an	NMDAR	127	 antagonist)	show	a	decrement	in	updating	to	consistent	stimulus	associations	128	 and	an	increase	in	decision	stochasticity	in	this	context	(Vinckier	et	al.,	2016).	129	 Attractor	network	perturbations	have	been	linked	to	working	memory	problems	130	 in	Scz	using	a	bistable	(i.e.	a	stable	‘up’	state	corresponding	to	persistent	131	 neuronal	activity,	and	a	‘down’	state	corresponding	to	background	activity)	132	 model	(Murray	et	al.,	2014),	but	not	as	yet	to	a	computational	understanding	of	133	 belief	updating.		134	 	 We	analysed	belief	updating	in	Scz	using	the	Hierarchical	Gaussian	Filter	135	 (HGF;	Mathys	et	al.,	2011),	a	variational	Bayesian	model	with	individual	priors,	136	 in	two	independent	‘probability	estimates’	beads	task	datasets.	We	asked:	given	137	 the	larger	belief	updates	in	Scz	compared	with	controls,	can	these	be	explained	138	 by	group	differences	in	i)	general	learning	rate	and/or	ii)	response	stochasticity,	139	 or	by	adding	parameters	encoding	iii)	the	variance	(i.e.	uncertainty)	of	beliefs	at	140	 the	start	of	the	sequence,	iv)	a	propensity	to	overweight	disconfirmatory	141	 evidence	specifically,	or	v)	patterns	of	belief	updating	typical	of	unstable	142	 attractor	states	in	a	Hopfield-type	network,	i.e.	greater	instability	and	143	 stochasticity,	which	correlate	with	each	other?	(Note	that	the	HGF	does	not	144	 contain	attractor	states:	the	model	in	(v)	is	designed	to	simulate	the	effects	on	145	 inference	that	unstable	neuronal	attractors	may	have.)	Furthermore,	are	these	146	 findings	consistent	within	Scz	tested	at	different	illness	phases,	and	are	they	147	 unique	to	Scz	or	also	present	in	other	non-psychotic	mood	disorders?	148	
Methods and Materials 149	
Subject characteristics 150	 	151	 Dataset	1	comprised	23	patients	with	delusions	(18	Scz),	22	patients	with	non-152	 psychotic	mood	disorders,	and	35	non-clinical	controls	(overall,	50	male	and	30	153	 female	–	see	Table	1	for	details	of	the	groups);	the	first	two	groups	were	selected	154	 from	inpatient	wards	at	the	Maudsley	and	the	Bethlem	Royal	Hospitals.	All	155	 groups	were	tested	twice	(with	loss	of	n=25	from	the	groups	–	see	Table	1);	the	156	 clinical	groups	were	tested	once	when	they	were	unwell	(‘baseline’),	and	again	157	 once	they	had	recovered	(‘follow-up’).	The	mean	time	between	testing	sessions	158	 was	17.4	(range	6	to	41)	weeks	in	the	deluded	group,	33.4	(range	4	to	68)	weeks	159	 in	the	clinical	control	group,	and	35.6	(range	27	to	46)	weeks	in	the	non-clinical	160	 control	group.	The	deluded	group’s	shorter	inter-test	interval	was	due	to	their	161	 shorter	admission	period	and	to	the	prioritization	of	their	follow-up	over	the	162	 non-clinical	control	group.	Dataset	1	is	described	in	detail	elsewhere	(Peters	and	163	 Garety,	2006).	164	 Dataset	2	comprised	56	subjects	with	a	diagnosis	of	schizophrenia	(Scz)	165	 and	111	controls	(overall,	83	male	and	84	female	–	see	Table	1).	All	subjects	166	 provided	informed,	written	consent,	and	ethical	permission	for	the	study	was	167	 obtained	from	the	local	NHS	Research	Ethics	Committee	(Reference	168	 14/LO/0532).	Given	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test	(Nelson,	1982)	was	used	to	169	 estimate	IQ	in	these	participants,	a	recruitment	condition	was	that	English	was	170	 their	first	language.	171	
Measures	of	cognitive	function	and	delusion-proneness	(or	schizotypy)	172	 were	collected	in	all	subjects;	clinical	symptom	ratings	were	collected	in	clinical	173	 subjects	only	(see	Table	1	for	details).	174	 	175	
Experimental design 176	 	177	 Subjects	in	dataset	1	performed	the	‘probability	estimates’	beads	task	as	used	178	 previously	(Garety	et	al.,	1991),	with	two	urns	with	ratios	of	85:15	and	15:85	179	 blue	and	red	beads	respectively,	and	viewing	a	single	sequence	of	ten	beads	180	 (Figure	2);	after	each	bead	they	had	to	mark	an	analogue	scale	(from	1	to	100)	181	 denoting	the	probability	the	urn	was	85%	red.		182	 Subjects	in	dataset	2	performed	the	‘probability	estimates’	beads	task,	183	 with	two	urns	with	ratios	of	80:20	and	20:80	red	and	blue	beads	respectively.	184	 They	each	viewed	four	separate	sequences	(two	identical	pairs	of	sequences	with	185	 the	colours	swapped	within	each	pair)	of	ten	beads	(Figure	2);	after	each	bead	186	 they	had	to	mark	a	Likert	scale	(from	1	to	7)	denoting	the	probability	the	urn	187	 was	the	80%	blue	one.	Two	sequences	contained	an	apparent	change	of	jar.	The	188	 order	of	the	four	sequences	was	randomised.		189	 We	used	some	of	the	behavioural	measures	employed	in	the	original	190	 analysis	of	dataset	1	(Peters	and	Garety,	2006)	to	analyse	dataset	2.	These	were	191	 ‘disconfirmatory	updating’,	the	mean	change	in	belief	on	seeing	a	bead	of	a	192	 different	colour	to	the	≥2	beads	preceding	it	and	‘final	certainty’	(the	response	to	193	 the	last	bead).	We	altered	their	‘initial	certainty’	measure	from	the	mean	194	 response	to	the	first	three	beads	to	the	response	to	the	first	bead,	which	comes	195	
closer	to	capturing	the	classic	‘jumping	to	conclusions’	bias	(in	which	around	196	 50%	of	Scz	decide	on	the	jar	colour	after	seeing	only	one	bead;	(Garety	et	al.,	197	 1991),	although	the	results	of	both	measures	are	presented	below.		198	 	199	
Computational modelling 200	 	201	 The	optimal	way	to	use	sensory	information	to	update	one’s	beliefs	under	202	 conditions	of	uncertainty	is	to	use	Bayesian	inference.	Neural	systems	are	likely	203	 to	approximate	Bayesian	inference	using	schemes	of	simple	update	equations	204	 (Rao	and	Ballard,	1999;	Friston,	2005);	one	such	model	is	the	Hierarchical	205	 Gaussian	Filter	(HGF).	The	HGF	is	a	hierarchical	Bayesian	inference	scheme	that	206	 gives	a	principled	account	of	how	beliefs	are	updated	on	acquiring	new	data,	207	 using	variational	Bayes	and	individual	priors.	Variational	Bayesian	schemes	(e.g.	208	 (Beal,	2003)	use	analytic	equations	to	derive	an	exact	solution	to	an	209	 approximation	of	the	posterior	distribution	over	the	latent	variables	and	210	 parameters	(as	opposed	to	sampling	methods	which	approximate	a	solution	to	211	 the	exact	posterior).	The	HGF	has	been	used	as	a	generic	state	model	for	learning	212	 under	uncertainty	and	has	repeatedly	been	shown	to	outperform	similar	213	 approaches,	such	as	reinforcement	learning	models	with	fixed	(e.g.	Rescorla-214	 Wagner)	or	dynamic	(e.g.	(Sutton,	1992)	learning	rates	(Iglesias	et	al.,	2013;	215	 Diaconescu	et	al.,	2014;	Hauser	et	al.,	2014;	Vossel	et	al.,	2014).	One	advantage	of	216	 the	HGF	is	that	it	contains	subject-specific	parameters	(and	prior	beliefs)	that	217	 can	account	for	between-subject	differences	in	learning	whilst	preserving	the	218	 (Bayes)	optimality	of	any	individual’s	learning	(relative	to	his/her	model	219	
parameters	and	prior	beliefs).	These	parameters	may	be	encoded	by	tonic	levels	220	 of	neuromodulators	such	as	dopamine	(Marshall	et	al.,	2016),	or	by	the	intrinsic	221	 properties	of	neuronal	networks	(e.g.	the	ratio	of	excitatory	to	inhibitory	neural	222	 activity	can	affect	both	the	speed	of	evidence	accumulation	(Lam	et	al.,	2017)	–	223	 analogous	to	the	evolution	rate	in	the	HGF	–	and	also	response	stochasticity	224	 (Murray	et	al.,	2014)).	Differences	in	model	parameters	between	Scz	and	225	 controls	may	therefore	explain,	in	computational	terms,	how	pathophysiology	226	 leads	to	abnormal	inference	(Adams	et	al.,	2015).	227	 In	general,	when	modelling	behaviour	under	Bayesian	assumptions,	it	is	228	 necessary	to	distinguish	between	the	model	of	the	world	used	by	the	subject	(the	229	 perceptual	model)	and	a	model	of	how	a	subject’s	beliefs	translated	into	230	 observed	behaviour	(the	observation	or	response	model).	Most	of	the	231	 parameters	pertain	to	the	perceptual	model	(here,	all	parameters	except	232	 response	stochasticity	ν	–	see	Table	2)	and	reflect	(inferred)	neuronal	233	 processing.	In	contrast,	the	parameters	of	the	response	model	link	subjective	234	 states	to	behavioural	outcomes,	and	thus	may	reflect	stochasticity	in	neuronal	235	 processing,	measurement	noise	(in	some	paradigms),	or	non-random	effects	that	236	 have	not	been	captured	by	the	perceptual	model.	This	and	related	learning	237	 models	are	freely	available	from	238	 http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas/	(version	5.1.0):	this	239	 analysis	used	the	perceptual	models	‘hgf_binary_scaled’	or	‘hgf_ar1_binary’	and	240	 the	response	model	‘beta_obs’.	241	 At	the	bottom	of	the	model	(Figure	3	shows	some	simulated	responses)	is	242	 the	bead	drawn	!(#)	on	trial	k	and	the	probability	%&(#) 	that	draws	are	coming	243	 from	the	blue	jar.	At	the	level	above	this	is	%',	the	tendency	towards	the	blue	jar	244	
(a	transform	of	the	probability,	bounded	by	±∞);	by	definition,	%& = )(%'),	where	245	 )(•)	is	the	logistic	sigmoid	function.	As	%'	approaches	infinity,	the	probability	of	246	 the	blue	jar	approaches	1;	as	it	approaches	minus	infinity,	the	probability	of	the	247	 blue	jar	approaches	0.	For	%' = 0,	both	jars	are	equally	probable.	This	quantity	is	248	 hidden	from	the	subject	and	must	be	inferred:	the	subject’s	posterior	estimate	of	249	 %'	is	,',	and	the	subject’s	posterior	estimate	of	the	probability	of	the	jar	being	250	 blue	on	trial	k	is	)-,'(#).	–	equivalent	to	the	prediction	(denoted	by	^)	on	the	next	251	 trial	,̂&(#0&).		252	 Before	seeing	any	new	input	on	trial	k	the	model’s	expected	jar	253	 probability	,̂&(#)	and	precisions	(inverse	variances)	12&(#), 12'(#)	of	the	expectations	254	 at	each	level	are	given	by:	255	 ,̂&(#) ≡ )-6&,'(#7&).	256	
12&(#) ≡ 1,̂&(#)(1 − ,̂&(#))	257	 12'(#) ≡ 1:'(#7&) + exp	(?)	258	 Note	that	in	Models	1-4,	6&	is	fixed	to	1.	A	new	input	!(#) ≡ ,&(#)	generates	259	 a	prediction	error	@&(#)	and	the	model	updates	and	generates	a	new	prediction	as	260	 follows:	261	 @&(#) ≡ ,&(#) − ,̂&(#)	262	
1'(#) = 12'(#) + 6&'12&(#)	263	 ,'(#) = ,'(#7&) + 6&1'(#) @&(#)	264	 ,̂&(#0&) ≡ )-6&,'(#).	265	
The	subject’s	response	A(#)	(i.e.	where	on	the	continuous	or	Likert	scale	266	 they	responded)	is	determined	by	,̂&(#0&)	and	the	precision	of	the	response	267	 model’s	beta	distribution	B.	268	 We	parameterize	the	beta	distribution	in	terms	of	its	mean	,	and	269	 precision	B.	These	sufficient	statistics	relate	to	the	conventional	270	 parameterization	in	terms	of	the	sufficient	statistics	C	and	D	by	the	following	271	 bijection:	272	 , ∶= CC + D	273	 B ∶= C + D	274	 	 Note	that	updates	to	,'	are	driven	by	the	product	of	the	prediction	error	275	 from	Bayesian	updating	explained	above	and	a	learning	rate	which,	crucially,	can	276	 change	over	time:	this	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	HGF	in	contrast	to	learning	277	 models	such	as	Rescorla-Wagner	that	have	a	fixed	learning	rate.	Parameters	278	 which	affect	the	degree	to	which	,'	can	change	during	the	experiment	include	ω,	279	
φ,	κ1	and	σ2(0).	The	contributions	of	φ	and	κ1	are	illustrated	in	Figure	4	(left	280	 panels).	281	 The	model	usually	has	a	third	level,	at	which	%F	encodes	the	phasic	282	 volatility	of	%'	(this	determines	the	probability	of	the	jar	changing	at	any	point):	283	 given	the	very	short	sequences	employed	in	our	datasets,	from	which	volatility	284	 cannot	be	reliably	estimated,	we	omitted	this	level.	In	any	case,	volatility	could	285	 not	account	for	the	rapid	changes	in	learning	rate	(from	trial	to	trial,	following	286	 confirmatory	vs	disconfirmatory	evidence)	present	in	the	Scz	group	in	these	287	 datasets.		288	
In	Models	1	and	2,	changes	in	x2	from	trial	to	trial	occur	only	according	to	289	 the	evolution	rate	ω,	the	variance	of	the	random	process	at	the	second	level.	290	 These	models	were	equivalent	to	the	subsequent	models	with	either	φ	(Models	3	291	 and	4)	fixed	to	0	or	κ1	(Models	5	and	6)	fixed	to	1.	292	 In	Models	3	and	4,	changes	in	x2	from	trial	to	trial	occur	according	to	an	293	 autoregressive	(AR(1))	process	that	is	controlled	by	three	parameters:	m,	the	294	 level	to	which	x2	is	attracted,	φ,	the	rate	of	change	of	x2	towards	m,	and	ω,	the	295	 variance	of	the	random	process:	296	 G-%'(#0&).	~	I-%'(#) + J(K − %'(#)), exp(?).	297	 After	inversion,	the	evolution	of	x2	according	to	this	equation	is	reflected	in	the	298	 prediction	of	,':		299	 ,̂'(#0&) = ,'(#) + J(K − ,'(#))	300	 	In	this	study,	given	there	was	no	bias	towards	one	jar	or	the	other,	m	was	301	 fixed	to	0,	so	φ	always	acted	to	shift	the	model’s	beliefs	back	towards	maximum	302	 uncertainty	(i.e.	disconfirm	the	current	belief)	about	the	jars.	Figure	4	(upper	left	303	 panel)	illustrates	the	effect	of	φ	on	)-,'(#).	over	time.		304	 In	Models	5	and	6,	changes	in	μ2	from	trial	to	trial	occur	according	to	two	305	 parameters:	ω,	the	variance	of	the	random	process,	and	κ1,	a	scaling	factor	that	306	 changes	the	size	of	updates	when	,̂&	=	0.5,	or	maximum	uncertainty,	relative	to	307	 when	,̂&	is	closer	to	0	or	1,	i.e.	when	the	subject	is	more	confident	about	either	308	 jar.	Figure	4	(lower	left	panel)	illustrates	the	effect	of	κ1	on	,̂&	over	time.	309	 Formally,	the	scaling	occurs	as:	310	 ,̂&(#0&) ≡ )-,'(#)6&.	311	
When	κ1	>	1,	updating	towards	1	on	observing	a	blue	bead	(u	=	1)	is	312	 greatest	(i.e.	switching	between	jars	becomes	more	likely)	when	,̂&	<	0.3;	when	313	
κ1	<	1,	updating	is	comparatively	far	lower	when	,̂&	<	0.3.	This	is	illustrated	in	314	 Figure	4	(middle	panel):	for	high	values	of	κ1	(brown	line),	belief	updates	that	315	 cross	the	,̂& = 0.5	line	encounter	little	resistance	(i.e.	little	evidence	is	required	316	 to	cause	a	large	shift),	while	approaching	the	extremes	of	,̂& = 0	and	,̂& = 1	in	317	 response	to	confirmatory	evidence	is	resisted	(belief	shifts	are	very	small	for	,̂&	318	 near	1).	By	contrast,	for	low	values	of	κ1	(black	line,	Figure	4	middle	panel),	there	319	 is	relatively	less	resistance	against	approaching	the	extremes	while	it	takes	more	320	 evidence	for	beliefs	to	cross	the	,̂& = 0.5	line.		321	 Figure	4	(right	panel)	illustrates	the	average	absolute	shifts	in	beliefs	on	322	 observing	beads	of	either	colour.	This	‘vulnerability	to	updating’	is	highly	323	 reminiscent	of	the	‘energy	state’	of	a	neural	network	model	–	i.e.	in	low	energy	324	 states,	less	updating	occurs.	The	effect	of	increasing	κ1	is	to	convert	confident	325	 beliefs	about	the	jar	(near	0	and	1)	from	low	to	high	‘energy	states’,	i.e.	to	make	326	 them	much	more	unstable.	This	recapitulates	the	attractor	network	properties	327	 illustrated	in	Figure	1:	an	unstable	network	easily	switches	from	one	state	to	328	 another	but	has	difficulty	stabilising	any	one	state,	whereas	a	stable	network	329	 requires	more	energy	(here,	information)	to	overcome	the	boundary	between	330	 two	states	(here,	beliefs).	Models	5	and	6	therefore	capture	the	effects	of	331	 attractor	(in)stability	on	belief	updating,	or	at	least	the	kind	of	updating	for	332	 which	(un)stable	attractor	states	are	a	good	analogy.		333	 As	group	differences	in	initial	updating	had	been	observed	in	dataset	1,	334	 we	also	estimated	the	standard	deviation	of	μ2	before	the	sequence	begins,	σ2(0),	335	 in	Models	2,	4	and	6.	336	
NB	for	intermediate	values	of	κ1,	Models	5	and	6	produce	similar	belief	337	 updating	trajectories	to	Models	3	and	4	(containing	the	disconfirmatory	updating	338	 parameter	φ):	both	make	greater	updates	following	disconfirmatory	evidence.	339	 For	more	extreme	values	of	κ1,	however,	Models	5	and	6	produce	trajectories	340	 that	Models	3	and	4	cannot:	φ	cannot	pull	beliefs	far	towards	certainty	in	the	341	 opposite	jar	(c.f.	brown	line	in	Figure	4,	lower	left	panel),	and	neither	can	it	make	342	 it	more	difficult	to	update	to	disconfirmatory	evidence	(c.f.	black	line	in	Figure	4,	343	 lower	left	panel).		344	 The	parameters	ω	and	ν	+/-	σ2(0)	+/-	φ	or	κ1	were	estimated	individually	345	 for	each	subject.	If	estimated,	the	prior	probability	distributions	for	their	values	346	 are	given	in	Table	2.	The	means	given	here	refer	to	the	parameters’	native	space,	347	 but	the	variances	refer	not	to	the	parameters’	native	space,	which	in	many	cases	348	 is	bounded,	but	to	the	unbounded	space	they	were	transformed	to	for	estimation	349	 purposes.	Otherwise	they	were	fixed	as	J = 	0	(Models	1	and	2)	and	:'(N) =350	 0.006	(Models	1,	3	and	5).	The	model’s	prior	beliefs	about	the	jars	at	the	start	of	351	 the	sequence	were	fixed	at	μ2(0)	=	0	(i.e.	believing	each	to	be	equally	likely).	The	352	 priors	were	sufficiently	uninformative	to	be	easily	updated	by	the	data:	all	prior	353	 means	are	standard	for	the	HGF	except	σ2(0),	which	had	to	be	increased	from	354	 0.006	to	0.8	to	allow	the	data	to	change	it.	The	latter	change	ensured	that	group	355	 differences	in	initial	belief	updating	alone	would	cause	group	differences	in	σ2(0)	356	 rather	than	κ1.	357	 	358	
Model fitting and statistical analysis 359	 	360	
We	tested	models	with	different	combinations	of	parameters	ω,	ν,	φ	or	κ1	and	361	
σ2(0)	(see	Table	2).	In	analysing	dataset	2,	we	concatenated	all	four	sequences	for	362	 each	subject	in	order	to	estimate	the	model	parameters	as	accurately	as	possible	363	 (resetting	the	beliefs	about	the	jars	at	the	start	of	each	sequence).		364	 	 After	fitting	the	six	models	to	each	subject’s	data,	we	performed	Bayesian	365	 model	selection	on	all	groups	separately	in	both	dataset	1	(at	baseline	and	366	 follow-up)	and	dataset	2.	This	procedure	weights	models	according	to	their	367	 accuracy	but	penalises	them	for	complexity	(i.e.	unnecessary	extra	parameters)	368	 to	prevent	overfitting	(Stephan	et	al.,	2009;	Rigoux	et	al.,	2014).	The	winning	369	 model	in	all	eight	groups	was	Model	6	(Figure	6),	although	around	a	third	of	370	 psychotic	subjects	and	non-clinical	controls	in	dataset	1	(at	baseline)	and	in	371	 dataset	2	were	better	fit	by	Model	4.	It	is	unclear	why	this	change	occurs,	but	372	 given	that	Model	6	can	produce	very	similar	trajectories	to	Model	4	for	373	 intermediate	values	of	κ1	(Figure	4),	any	increase	in	response	stochasticity	is	374	 likely	to	diminish	the	strength	of	evidence	for	one	model	over	a	similar	one.	375	 	 In	order	to	confirm	we	could	reliably	estimate	the	parameters	of	the	376	 winning	model,	Model	6,	we	simulated	100	datasets	using	the	modal	values	of	377	 the	parameters	for	both	control	and	Scz	groups	(Figure	5,	upper	and	lower	rows	378	 respectively;	an	example	simulated	dataset	is	shown	in	Figure	3).	We	then	379	 estimated	the	parameters	for	the	simulated	data,	and	showed	that	in	most	cases,	380	 the	parameters	are	recovered	reasonably	accurately.	The	exception	was	σ2(0)	in	381	 the	Scz	group	simulation,	which	was	distributed	around	the	prior	mean	of	0.8	382	 rather	than	the	true	value	of	1.5.	We	retained	a	prior	mean	of	0.8	for	σ2(0)	383	 because	using	a	higher	prior	mean	led	to	overestimation	of	σ2(0)	in	other	384	 simulations	(not	shown).	385	
	386	
Results 387	
	388	
Behavioural results: dataset 1 389	 	390	 Each	group’s	mean	responses	are	plotted	in	Figure	2A,	and	statistical	tests	391	 detailed	in	Table	1	(p(adj)	refers	to	the	adjusted	p	value	of	Tukey’s	HSD	post	hoc	392	 test).	As	described	previously	(Peters	and	Garety,	2006),	at	baseline	there	was	a	393	 significant	difference	in	disconfirmatory	updating	between	the	groups	(F(2,77)	=	394	 6,	p	=	0.004,	ANOVA),	and	the	psychotic	group	had	greater	disconfirmatory	395	 updating	than	the	non-clinical	controls	(p(adj)	=	0.003)	but	not	the	clinical	396	 controls	(p(adj)	=	0.4).	There	was	no	difference	between	the	clinical	and	non-397	 clinical	controls	(p(adj)	=	0.13).	There	were	also	significant	differences	in	initial	398	 certainty	across	the	three	groups	(F(2,77)	=	8.7,	p	=	0.0004,	ANOVA);	the	399	 psychotic	group’s	initial	certainty	was	higher	than	the	non-clinical	controls’	400	 (p(adj)	=	0.0003)	but	not	the	clinical	controls’	(p(adj)	=	0.25).	There	wasn’t	a	401	 significant	difference	between	the	clinical	and	non-clinical	control	groups	(p(adj)	402	 =	0.06).	There	were	no	group	differences	in	final	certainty	(F(2,77)	=	0.7,	p	=	0.5,	403	 ANOVA).	404	 	 At	follow-up,	the	difference	in	disconfirmatory	updating	between	the	405	 groups	was	no	longer	significant	(F(2,52)	=	2.9,	p	=	0.06,	ANOVA);	the	psychotic	406	 group	had	greater	disconfirmatory	updating	than	the	non-clinical	controls	407	 (p(adj)	=	0.049)	but	not	the	clinical	controls	(p(adj)	=	0.4).	There	was	no	408	
significant	difference	in	initial	certainty	across	the	groups	(F(2,52)	=	0.9,	p	=	0.4,	409	 ANOVA).	Differences	in	final	certainty	were	no	longer	significant	(F(2,52)	=	2.8,	p	410	 =	0.07,	ANOVA);	the	biggest	difference	was	the	non-clinical	controls’	final	411	 certainty	which	was	numerically	higher	than	the	clinical	controls’	(p(adj)	=	412	 0.057).		413	 	 There	were	negative	correlations	between	initial	certainty	and	414	 disconfirmatory	updating	at	both	baseline	(ρ	=	-0.41,	p	=	0.00015)	and	follow-up	415	 (ρ	=	-0.41,	p	=	0.002),	but	not	between	final	certainty	and	the	other	two	416	 measures	(p	>0.1	in	all	four	comparisons).	417	 	418	
Behavioural results: dataset 2 419	 	420	 The	mean	responses	of	subjects	in	each	group	are	plotted	in	Figure	2B.	There	421	 was	a	significant	increase	in	disconfirmatory	updating	in	Scz	compared	with	422	 controls	(t(88.6)	=	2.1,	p	=	0.04,	Welch’s	t-test).	There	was	mixed	evidence	for	a	423	 difference	in	initial	certainty	between	Scz	and	controls:	Scz	were	more	certain	424	 after	the	first	bead	in	sequences	A	and	B	but	not	C	or	D	(Figure	2	and	Table	2),	425	 but	the	difference	in	mean	initial	certainty	fell	short	of	statistical	significance	426	 (t(110)	=	-1.9,	p	=	0.059,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.32,	Welch’s	t-test).	Final	certainty	was	427	 only	assessed	in	sequences	A	and	D	(B	and	C	contained	two	changes	of	colour	in	428	 the	last	three	beads):	in	both	sequences,	Scz	were	less	certain	than	controls	429	 (sequence	A:	t(80.1)	=	3.0,	p	=	0.004,	sequence	D:	t(85.5)	=	3.4,	p	=	0.001,	Welch’s	430	
t-tests).		431	
	 Initial	certainty	and	disconfirmatory	updating	negatively	correlated	432	 within	both	Scz	(ρ	=	-0.46,	p	=	0.0003)	and	control	(ρ	=	-0.57,	p	=	10-11)	groups.	433	 Final	certainty	did	not	correlate	with	either	measure	in	either	group	(p	>	0.4	in	434	 four	comparisons).		435	 	436	
Modelling results: dataset 1 437	 	438	 Model	selection	results	for	the	three	groups	analysed	separately	at	both	baseline	439	 and	follow-up	are	plotted	in	Figure	6	(columns	1,	2,	4	and	5);	the	probability	of	440	 each	model	being	best	for	any	given	subject	is	shown	in	the	left	panel,	and	the	441	 probability	of	each	model	being	the	best	overall	is	shown	in	the	right	panel.	442	 Model	6	is	the	clear	winner	at	each	time	point,	although	a	minority	of	psychotic	443	 and	clinical	controls	are	best	fit	by	Model	4.		444	 	 Model	6’s	parameter	distributions	are	shown	in	Figure	7;	they	are	445	 skewed,	hence	non-parametric	tests	were	used	to	determine	group	differences	446	 (full	details	in	Table	3;	p(adj)	refers	to	the	adjusted	p	value	of	Dunn’s	post	hoc	447	 test).	At	baseline	there	were	large	group	differences	in	belief	instability	κ1	448	 (χ2(2,n=80)	=	9.64,	p	=	0.008,	η2	=	0.12,	Kruskal-Wallis’	one-way	ANOVA	on	449	 ranks)	and	response	stochasticity	ν	(χ2(2,n=80)	=	11.9,	p	=	0.003,	η2	=	0.15)	but	450	 not	in	σ2(0)	or	ω.	There	were	statistically	significant	differences	in	κ1	between	the	451	 non-clinical	controls	and	both	the	psychotic	group	(p(adj)	=	0.01,	Dunn’s	test)	452	 and	the	clinical	control	group	(p(adj)	=	0.01),	but	not	between	the	latter	two	453	 groups	(p(adj)	=	0.4).	Similarly,	there	were	statistically	significant	differences	in	454	
ν	between	the	non-clinical	controls	and	both	the	psychotic	group	(p(adj)	=	0.002,	455	
Dunn’s	test)	and	the	clinical	control	group	(p(adj)	=	0.01),	but	not	between	the	456	 latter	two	groups	(p(adj)	=	0.3).	457	 	 At	follow-up,	there	were	still	large	group	differences	in	κ1	(χ2(2,n=55)	=	458	 8.0,	p	=	0.02,	η2	=	0.15,	Kruskal-Wallis’	one-way	ANOVA	on	ranks)	and	ν	459	 (χ2(2,n=55)	=	8.5,	p	=	0.01,	η2	=	0.16)	but	not	in	σ2(0)	or	ω.	There	was	a	significant	460	 difference	in	κ1	between	the	psychotic	and	non-clinical	control	groups	(p(adj)	=	461	 0.007,	Dunn’s	test)	but	not	the	clinical	and	non-clinical	control	groups	(p(adj)	=	462	 0.1);	ν	remained	significantly	different	between	the	non-clinical	controls	and	463	 both	the	psychotic	group	(p(adj)	=	0.01,	Dunn’s	test)	and	now	also	between	the	464	 psychotic	and	clinical	control	groups	(p(adj)	=	0.01),	but	not	between	the	clinical	465	 and	non-clinical	controls	(p(adj)	=	0.5).	466	 	 We	explored	whether	group	differences	in	κ1	or	ν	at	baseline	and	follow	467	 up	might	be	ascribable	to	IQ	(Quick	Test	score	(Ammons	and	Ammons,	1962)),	468	 as	the	groups’	IQ	scores	were	not	equivalent	(Table	1).	Including	both	IQ	and	469	 group	status	within	one	regression	model	is	an	unsound	method	of	testing	for	470	 confounding	by	IQ	because	group	and	IQ	are	clearly	not	independent	here	(Miller	471	 and	Chapman,	2001),	so	we	tested	for	relationships	between	the	parameters	and	472	 IQ	separately	within	each	group	at	each	time	point.	No	relationships	reached	473	 statistical	significance	(all	p	>	0.1),	the	closest	being	a	trend	between	κ1	and	IQ	in	474	 non-clinical	controls	only	(r	=	-0.30,	p	=	0.08);	nevertheless,	given	the	smaller	475	 group	sizes	and	larger	between-	versus	within-group	variances,	it	remains	476	 plausible	that	IQ	differences	contribute	to	group	parameter	differences.	477	 We	tested	whether	κ1	or	ν	at	baseline	related	to	delusion-proneness	478	 (Peters	Delusion	Inventory	score)	across	all	groups,	after	first	excluding	any	479	 interaction	between	PDI	and	group;	PDI	significantly	correlated	with	ν	(F(1,67)	=	480	
7.1,	p	=	0.01,	ANCOVA)	but	not	κ1	(F(1,67)	=	3.2,	p	=	0.079,	ANCOVA).	We	tested	481	 whether	κ1	or	ν	at	baseline	was	correlated	with	any	particular	subgroup	of	482	 symptoms	(measured	using	the	Manchester	Scale	(Krawiecka	et	al.,	1977))	in	483	 both	clinical	groups	only,	using	the	regression	models	κ1	[or	ν]	~	const	+	484	
ν1*MSaffective	+	ν2*MSpositive	+	ν3*MSnegative:	none	of	the	models	were	485	 significant,	however	(all	p	>	0.1).		486	 At	baseline,	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	correlation	between	κ1	and	487	 antipsychotic	medication	dose	(p	=	0.3),	but	the	correlation	between	ν	and	488	 medication	dose	approached	significance	(ρ	=	-0.4,	p	=	0.067).	489	 We	tested	for	correlations	between	the	Model	6	parameters	(Spearman’s	490	
ρ	was	used	where	distributions	were	not	parametric):	κ1	and	ν	were	negatively	491	 correlated	both	at	baseline	(ρ	=	-0.38,	p	=	0.0004)	and	at	follow	up	(ρ	=	-0.52,	p	=	492	 0.0001),	as	were	κ1	and	ω	at	baseline	(ρ	=	-0.47,	p	=	10-5)	and	follow	up	(ρ	=	-493	 0.53,	p	=	10-5).	In	estimating	the	parameters	from	simulated	data,	the	only	494	 correlation	present	in	both	simulations	(indicating	some	consistent	trading-off	495	 between	these	parameters	during	estimation)	was	between	κ1	and	ω,	with	r	=	-496	 0.5	in	each	case.	This	is	not	surprising,	as	both	κ1	and	ω	affect	updating	to	new	497	 information	throughout	the	sequence	(unlike	σ2(0))	in	a	deterministic	way	(unlike	498	
ν).	Nevertheless,	κ1	was	estimated	very	reliably	in	the	first	simulation	(Figure	5,	499	 top	row)	and	with	reasonable	accuracy	in	the	second	(Figure	5,	bottom	row),	so	500	 we	are	confident	that	the	group	differences	in	κ1	are	genuine.	The	correlations	of		501	
ρ	≈	-0.5	between	ω	and	κ1	in	dataset	1	are	unlikely	to	be	reliable,	however.	502	 	503	
Modelling results: dataset 2 504	 	505	 We	tested	the	same	six	models	and	performed	Bayesian	model	selection	as	506	 before.	As	in	dataset	1,	the	winning	model	was	Model	6	overall	and	in	each	group	507	 separately	(Figure	6),	although	in	the	Scz	group	a	minority	were	best	captured	508	 by	Model	4.	Model	6’s	parameter	distributions	are	shown	in	Figure	8;	they	are	509	 skewed,	so	non-parametric	tests	were	used	(full	details	in	Table	3).		510	 	 As	in	dataset	1,	belief	instability	κ1	was	significantly	higher	in	Scz	than	in	511	 controls	(Z	=	-5.6,	p	=	10-8,	Mann-Whitney	U	test)	with	a	medium-to-large	effect	512	 size	(r	=	0.43);	also	response	stochasticity	ν	was	lower	in	Scz	than	in	controls	(Z	513	 =	3.9,	p	=	0.0001,	r	=	0.3,	Mann-Whitney	U	test),	as	was	initial	belief	variance	σ2(0)	514	 (Z	=	3.1,	p	=	0.002,	r	=	0.24,	Mann-Whitney	U	test).	There	were	no	statistically	515	 significant	group	differences	in	evolution	rate	ω.	See	Figures	6	and	7	for	516	 examples	of	model	fits	in	subjects	with	lower	κ1	values	(two	controls	in	Figure	9)	517	 and	higher	κ1	values	(two	Scz	subjects	in	Figure	10);	each	figure	also	illustrates	518	 the	effects	of	lower	and	higher	ω	values	(in	the	top	and	bottom	rows	519	 respectively).	We	repeated	the	analysis	using	a	subset	of	the	controls	(n=60)	that	520	 were	better	matched	in	age	and	sex,	as	the	original	control	group	was	younger	521	 and	more	female	than	the	patient	group	(Table	1).	The	group	differences	in	κ1	522	 and	ν	were	unchanged	in	this	analysis	(Z	=	-4.1,	p	=	0.00004;	Z	=	3.4,	p	=	0.0007	523	 respectively,	Mann-Whitney	U	tests),	but	that	in	σ2(0)	was	no	longer	significant	(Z	524	 =	1.9,	p	=	0.056,	Mann-Whitney	U	test).		525	 	 Although	IQ	(National	Adult	Reading	Test	score	(Nelson,	1982))	was	526	 evenly	matched	in	these	groups,	working	memory	(Letter	Number	Sequencing	527	 score	(Wechsler,	1997))	was	lower	in	Scz	than	in	controls	(see	Table	1).	We	528	
explored	whether	the	group	parameter	differences	might	be	related	to	working	529	 memory,	by	testing	for	correlations	between	κ1	or	ν	and	working	memory	in	each	530	 group	separately	(Miller	and	Chapman,	2001):	none	were	statistically	significant	531	 (all	p	>	0.1).	We	also	tested	for	relationships	between	κ1	or	ν	and	IQ	(NART)	in	532	 each	group:	ν	and	IQ	(NART)	were	correlated	in	Scz	(r	=	0.33,	p	=	0.014),	but	no	533	 other	relationships	were	significant	(all	p	>	0.1).	534	 	 We	tested	whether	κ1	or	ν	related	to	schizotypy	(Schizotypal	Personality	535	 Questionnaire	score)	across	all	groups	but	neither	did	so	(both	p	=	0.4,	ANCOVA).	536	 We	tested	whether	κ1	or	ν	were	predicted	by	any	particular	subgroup	of	537	 symptoms	(measured	using	the	Positive	and	Negative	Symptom	Scale	(Kay	et	al.,	538	 1987))	in	the	Scz	group	only,	using	the	regression	model	κ1	[or	ν]	~	const	+	539	
ν1*PANSSgeneral	+	ν2*PANSSpositive	+	ν3*PANSSnegative:	the	κ1	model	was	not	540	 significant	(F	=	0.9,	p	=	0.4),	but	ν	was	weakly	predicted	by	negative	symptoms	541	 (overall	F	=	2.76,	p	=	0.051;	for	ν3,	t	=	-2.1,	p	=	0.04).	We	had	no	record	of	542	 medication	dose	in	dataset	2.	543	 	 We	tested	for	correlations	between	the	Model	6	parameters:	as	in	dataset	544	 1,	κ1	and	ν	were	negatively	correlated	(Figure	8;	ρ	=	-0.35,	p	=	10-6),	but	unlike	545	 dataset	1,	the	only	other	statistically	significant	correlation	was	between	κ1	and	546	
σ2(0)	(ρ	=	-0.54,	p	=	10-13).	There	was	a	correlation	of	r	=	-0.2	between	κ1	and	ν	in	547	 the	data	simulated	from	modal	Scz	parameter	values	(Figure	5,	bottom	row),	but	548	 no	correlation	in	the	first.	This	implies	that	the	consistent	correlations	between	549	 these	parameters	of	ρ	=	-0.38,	ρ	=	-0.52	(dataset	1	baseline	and	follow-up)	and	ρ	550	 =	-0.35	(dataset	2)	are	unlikely	to	be	just	estimation	artefacts.	The	only	other	551	 correlation	between	parameters	in	the	simulated	data	was	between	σ2(0)	and	κ1,	552	
of	r	=	-0.25,	in	the	first	simulation	only.	These	parameters	were	correlated	in	553	 dataset	2	but	not	dataset	1.	 	554	
Discussion 555	
Scz	tend	to	update	their	beliefs	more	to	unexpected	information	and	less	to	556	 consistent	information,	compared	to	controls.	We	have	replicated	these	557	 behavioural	effects,	and	demonstrated	a	computational	basis	for	them	that	is	558	 informed	by	the	unstable	attractor	hypothesis	of	schizophrenia.	In	559	 computational	models	of	two	‘beads	task’	datasets,	Scz	had	consistently	greater	560	 belief	instability	(κ1)	and	response	stochasticity	(ν)	than	controls,	as	the	unstable	561	 attractor	hypothesis	predicts.	Furthermore,	ν	correlated	with	κ1	in	all	three	562	 experiments,	supporting	the	idea	that	ν	is	measuring	a	stochasticity	that	is	563	 related	to	κ1	by	an	underlying	neurobiological	process,	rather	than	simply	an	564	 unmodelled	effect.	565	 	 	These	findings	are	important	because	they	connect	numerous	reasoning	566	 biases	previously	found	in	Scz	–	e.g.	a	disconfirmatory	bias	(Garety	et	al.,	1991;	567	 Fear	and	Healy,	1997;	Young	and	Bentall,	1997;	Peters	and	Garety,	2006),	568	 increased	initial	certainty	(Peters	and	Garety,	2006),	and	decreased	final	569	 certainty	(Horga,	in	preparation)	–	and	its	associated	stochasticity	in	responding	570	 (Moutoussis	et	al.,	2011;	Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2013)	to	model	parameters	that	571	 describe	how	belief	updating	in	cortex	could	be	perturbed	by	unstable	attractor	572	 states	due	to	NMDA	(or	dopamine	1)	receptor	hypofunction	(Figure	1).		573	 The	unique	features	of	Model	6	that	make	attractor	dynamics	a	574	 compelling	neurobiological	explanation	for	its	dominance	are	both	Scz	and	575	 controls’	non-linearities	in	belief	updating	to	confirmatory	versus	576	
disconfirmatory	evidence.	The	Scz	group	updated	its	beliefs	(sometimes	much)	577	 more	to	disconfirmatory	than	confirmatory	evidence	–	particularly	at	points	of	578	 relative	certainty	about	the	jar	–	and	the	controls	were	the	opposite.	Models	with	579	 uniformly	high	or	low	learning	rates	cannot	reproduce	these	effects;	and	adding	580	 high-	or	low-level	(sensory)	uncertainty	to	a	hierarchical	model	would	lead	to	581	 uniformly	high	or	low	learning	rates	respectively.	Although	Models	3	and	4	do	582	 show	differential	updating	to	confirmatory	vs	disconfirmatory	evidence,	this	583	 results	in	beliefs	in	either	jar	hovering	around	0.5	(as	in	Figure	4,	top	left)	rather	584	 than	making	large	updates	from	belief	in	one	jar	to	the	other	(as	when	κ1	=	585	 exp(1.2):	Figure	4,	bottom	left).	Furthermore,	degraded	neuronal	ensemble	firing	586	 (consistent	with	unstable	attractor	states)	has	recently	been	shown	to	be	587	 common	to	two	different	mouse	models	of	schizophrenia	(Hamm	et	al.,	2017).		588	 	 In	dataset	1,	belief	instability	κ1	and	response	stochasticity	ν	were	also	589	 significantly	different	between	the	clinical	(mood	disorder)	and	non-clinical	590	 control	groups	when	the	former	were	unwell,	but	not	at	follow-up,	whereas	the	591	 differences	between	the	psychotic	group	and	non-clinical	controls	persisted.	This	592	 indicates	that	the	same	computational	parameters	can	be	perturbed	in	either	a	593	 trait-	or	state-like	manner,	perhaps	by	different	mechanisms.	It	seems	unlikely	594	 that	these	parameter	changes	simply	reflect	a	lack	of	engagement	with	the	task	595	 in	clinical	groups	(especially	when	unwell),	because	the	consistent	changes	in	κ1	596	 –	with	which	the	changes	in	ν	consistently	correlate	–	reflect	specific	patterns	of	597	 belief	updating.	598	
Parameter relationships with cognition and symptoms 599	
  600	 	 Neither	κ1	nor	ν	showed	significant	relationships	with	IQ	(in	dataset	1)	or	601	 working	memory	(in	dataset	2)	within	the	groups,	giving	some	indication	that	602	 the	group	differences	in	these	cognitive	measures	were	unlikely	to	be	the	main	603	 drivers	of	group	differences	in	the	parameters.	Nevertheless,	aside	from	the	604	 correlation	between	response	stochasticity	ν	and	IQ	in	dataset	2,	it	is	perhaps	605	 surprising	that	there	weren’t	more	relationships	between	κ1	or	ν	and	cognitive	606	 measures	in	Scz,	given	it	is	likely	that	abnormal	prefrontal	dynamics	have	607	 profound	effects	on	all	these	variables.	We	may	have	lacked	power	to	detect	608	 them	–	though	dataset	2	had	80%	power	to	detect	a	correlation	of	0.33	–	or	609	 perhaps	different	prefrontal	regions	contribute	to	working	memory,	IQ	and	610	 belief	updating.		611	 	 One	might	also	question	why	there	were	no	strong	relationships	between	612	
κ1	or	ν	and	positive	or	negative	symptom	domains	(negative	symptoms	were	613	 weakly	associated	with	ν	in	dataset	2	only).	Again,	power	may	have	been	an	614	 issue,	although	note	that	across	all	subjects	in	dataset	1,	response	stochasticity	ν	615	 was	associated	with	PDI	score	even	after	including	group	in	the	model,	indicating	616	 a	potential	relationship	with	delusions,	but	not	with	the	broader	concept	of	617	 schizotypy	(assessed	in	dataset	2).	It	is	also	likely	that	other	pathological	factors	618	 contribute	to	symptoms,	beyond	those	measured	here	(e.g.	striatal	dopamine	619	 availability	and	positive	symptoms).	Of	note,	two	other	computational	studies	620	 demonstrating	clear	working	memory	parameter	differences	between	Scz	and	621	 controls	also	failed	to	detect	any	relationship	between	those	parameters	and	622	 symptom	domains	(Collins	et	al.,	2014,	2017).	Both	their	and	our	Scz	groups	623	
were	taking	antipsychotic	medication,	which	is	also	likely	to	weaken	correlations	624	 of	parameters	to	positive	symptoms.	625	 	 Although	replicated	numerous	times	in	the	beads	task,	a	‘disconfirmatory	626	 bias’	is	perhaps	surprising	in	Scz,	given	one	might	expect	delusional	subjects	to	627	 show	a	bias	against	disconfirmatory	evidence	(as	indeed	they	do	in	tasks	628	 involving	scenario	interpretation	(Woodward	et	al.,	2006)).	In	fact,	the	629	 disconfirmatory	bias	is	misleadingly	named,	as	Scz	make	large	shifts	in	beliefs	630	 both	away	from	and	back	towards	the	current	hypothesis	(there	are	numerous	631	 examples	in	both	datasets	in	Figure	2).	This	pronounced	switching	behaviour	in	632	 the	beads	task	is	likely	to	illustrate	a	more	fundamental	instability	of	cognition	633	 and	prefrontal	dynamics	in	Scz,	rather	than	being	related	to	delusions	634	 specifically;	indeed,	the	latter	may	be	an	attempt	to	remedy	the	former.				635	 	 It	is	interesting	that	non-clinical	controls’	data	were	also	best	fit	by	Model	636	 6	in	both	datasets,	implying	that	even	healthy	subjects	show	some	asymmetry	in	637	 their	belief	updating	to	expected	versus	unexpected	evidence.	Most	non-clinical	638	 control	subjects	had	κ1<1,	i.e.	reduced	updating	to	changing	evidence.		639	
Related modelling studies 640	 	 How	do	these	findings	relate	to	other	computational	modelling	work	in	641	 Scz?	A	study	of	unmedicated,	mainly	first	episode	Scz	performing	a	reversal	642	 learning	task	(Schlagenhauf	et	al.,	2013)	also	demonstrated	an	increased	643	 tendency	to	switch	that	was	not	accounted	for	by	reward	sensitivity	(which	644	 would	be	affected	by	more	stochastic	behaviour),	and	increased	switching	also	645	 occurs	in	chronic	Scz	(Waltz	et	al.,	2013),	although	not	always	(Pantelis	et	al.,	646	 1999).		647	
Two	recent	studies	of	similar	tasks	in	Scz	populations	have	also	648	 demonstrated	evidence	of	non-linear	belief	updating.	(Jardri	et	al.,	2017)	showed	649	 that	the	Scz	group	on	average	“overcount”	the	likelihood	in	a	single	belief	update;	650	 an	effect	they	attribute	to	reverberating	cortical	message-passing,	but	which	651	 could	also	be	due	to	the	belief	instability	shown	by	Model	6.	(Stuke	et	al.,	2017)	652	 showed	in	a	very	similar	task	that	all	subjects	showed	evidence	of	non-linear	653	 updating,	but	the	Scz	group	updated	more	than	controls	to	“irrelevant	654	 information”	(i.e.	disconfirmatory	evidence).	Some	differences	between	their	655	 model	and	ours	are	that	they	did	not	estimate	response	stochasticity	in	their	656	 subjects	(neither	did	(Jardri	et	al.,	2017),	and	their	‘non-linearity’	parameter	was	657	 bounded	by	linear	updating	on	one	side,	roughly	equivalent	to	belief	instability	658	
κ1	being	constrained	to	being	<1	in	our	model,	whereas	we	have	shown	(as	in	659	 (Jardri	et	al.,	2017)	that	Scz	belief	updating	is	often	beyond	this	bound	(Figure	7),	660	 and	more	stochastic.	Conversely,	(Moutoussis	et	al.,	2011)	demonstrated	661	 increased	response	stochasticity	in	acutely	psychotic	subjects,	but	did	not	test	662	 for	differences	in	belief	updating.	663	 The	extent	to	which	a	loss	of	belief	stability	in	Scz	is	apparent	depends	664	 critically	on	the	strength	(precision)	of	incoming	sensory	evidence	relative	to	the	665	 current	belief	(prior):	if	the	former	is	less	precise,	no	belief	switching	may	occur,	666	 and	instead	the	percept	may	be	weighted	towards	the	prior.	In	the	beads	task,	667	 sensory	evidence	(i.e.,	the	colour	of	the	bead	drawn)	is	unambiguous,	but	a	task	668	 using	very	imprecise	auditory	sensory	evidence	(Powers	et	al.,	2017)	669	 demonstrated	some	interesting	heterogeneity	in	Scz:	non-hallucinating	Scz	670	 showed	greater	belief	updating	relative	to	controls,	while	in	hallucinating	Scz,	671	
percepts	were	driven	by	prior	expectations,	leading	to	a	reduction	in	the	672	 updating	of	their	beliefs	(relative	to	controls).	673	 	 Further	evidence	for	heterogeneity	in	Scz	is	that	those	with	delusions	674	 have	greater	certainty	about	the	hypothesis	that	matches	the	evidence	at	every	675	 stage	(Speechley	et	al.,	2010),	unlike	the	reduced	final	certainty	we	observed	in	676	 Scz	in	dataset	2.	On	the	other	hand,	Scz	with	high	negative	symptoms	have	677	 difficulty	choosing	the	most	rewarding	option	very	consistently	(Gold	et	al.,	678	 2012),	which	may	reflect	a	lack	of	certainty	about	its	value.	We	lacked	sufficient	679	 power	to	detect	differences	between	Scz	with	exclusively	high	positive	or	680	 negative	symptoms,	however.		681	
Limitations 682	 	 Each	of	our	datasets	contains	some	limitations	of	the	beads	task	that	are	683	 addressed	by	the	other.	Dataset	1	did	not	include	a	memory	aid	or	measure	684	 working	memory,	but	dataset	2	did	both,	and	dataset	2	also	matched	IQ	across	685	 groups	much	better	than	dataset	1;	dataset	2	used	a	Likert	scale	for	responding	686	 and	so	could	potentially	exaggerate	small	changes	in	belief	updating,	but	dataset	687	 1	used	a	continuous	measure;	dataset	2	only	tested	stable	outpatients,	but	688	 dataset	1	tested	more	unwell	inpatients	and	retested	them	once	they	were	689	 better.	The	main	limitation	common	to	both	datasets	is	that	all	subjects	with	690	 psychotic	diagnoses	were	taking	antipsychotic	medication	when	tested.	Although	691	 the	correlation	between	ν	and	medication	dose	was	almost	significant	in	dataset	692	 1,	this	relationship	seems	likely	to	be	driven	by	illness	severity	rather	than	693	 medication	itself.	Dopamine	2	receptor	antagonists	seem	to	both	reduce	694	 overconfidence	in	probabilistic	reasoning		(Andreou	et	al.,	2014),	and	also	695	
reduce	motor	response	variability	(Galea	et	al.,	2013)	and	so	if	anything	likely	696	 reduce	our	group	differences.		697	
Conclusion 698	 	 In	conclusion,	we	have	shown	that	Scz	subjects	in	two	independent	beads	699	 task	datasets	have	consistent	differences	in	two	parameters	of	a	belief	updating	700	 model	that	attempts	to	reproduce	consequences	of	attractor	network	instability.	701	 Note	that	this	study	was	designed	to	link	patterns	of	inferences	to	model	702	 parameters	that	(do	or	don’t)	mimic	the	effects	of	abnormal	attractor	states	on	703	 belief	updating.	The	HGF	itself	does	not	contain	attractor	states	and	no	relation	704	 between	its	parameters	and	NMDAR	function	has	hitherto	been	tested.	More	705	 detailed	spiking	network	modelling,	pharmacological	(or	other	NMDAR)	706	 manipulations	and	imaging	are	required	in	future	to	understand	how	707	 neuromodulatory	function	in	both	pyramidal	cells	and	inhibitory	interneurons	708	 contributes	to	real	attractor	dynamics	and	probabilistic	inference,	and	to	seek	709	 empirical	evidence	for	a	correspondence	between	the	stability	of	network	states	710	 and	the	stability	of	its	inferences	(especially	in	schizophrenia).	This	work	711	 underscores	the	importance	of	relating	psychological	biases	to	their	underlying	712	 computational	mechanisms,	and	thence	(in	future)	to	the	constraints	–	e.g.	the	713	 hypofunction	of	NMDARs	–	that	neurobiology	imposes	on	these	mechanisms.	714	 	715	
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Figure Legends 
	
Figure	1:	Effects	of	attractor	network	dynamics	on	belief	updating		
	This	schematic	illustrates	the	energy	landscapes	of	two	Hopfield-type	networks	each	with	two	basins	of	attraction.	The	continuous	black	line	depicts	a	normal	network	whose	basins	of	attraction	are	relatively	deep.	The	dotted	black	line	depicts	the	effect	of	NMDAR	(or	cortical	dopamine	1	receptor	(Durstewitz	and	Seamans,	2008))	hypofunction	(Abi-Saab	et	al.,	1998;	Javitt	et	al.,	2012)	on	the	energy	landscape:	the	attractor	basins	become	more	shallow.	We	assume	that	Basins	A	and	B	correspond	to	different	inferences	about	(hidden)	states	in	the	world,	e.g.	one	jar	or	another	being	the	source	of	beads	in	the	beads	task.	The	dots	correspond	to	the	networks’	representations	of	either	control	or	Scz	subjects’	beliefs	about	these	hidden	states.	Such	networks	are	highly	reminiscent	of	Hopfield	networks	with	two	stored	representations	–	in	this	case,	the	representations	correspond	to	inferences	about	hidden	states,	rather	than	memories.	The	arrows	depict	the	changes	in	network	states	resulting	from	sensory	evidence	for	(solid	arrows)	or	against	(dashed	arrows)	the	current	inference.	When	the	attractor	basin	is	shallower,	it	is	harder	for	supportive	evidence	to	stabilise	the	current	state	much	further,	but	it	is	easier	for	contradictory	evidence	–	or	just	stochastic	neuronal	firing	–	to	shift	the	current	network	state	towards	an	alternative	state.	These	changes	in	network	dynamics	may	also	be	reflected	in	the	inferences	the	network	computes	–	i.e.	easier	switching	between	attractor	basins	may	correspond	to	easier	switching	between	
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beliefs	–	although	this	is	yet	to	be	demonstrated	experimentally.	NMDAR	hypofunction	could	contribute	to	an	increased	tendency	to	switch	between	beliefs	and	increased	stochasticity	in	responding	in	several	ways	(Rolls	et	al.,	2008):	i)	by	reducing	inhibitory	interneuron	activity,	via	weakened	NMDAR	synapses	from	pyramidal	cells	to	interneurons,	such	that	other	attractor	states	are	less	suppressed	when	one	is	active	(a	spiking	network	model	has	shown	that	this	leads	to	more	rapid	initial	belief	updating	in	perceptual	tasks	(Lam	et	al.,	2017)),	ii)	by	reducing	pyramidal	cell	activity,	via	weakened	recurrent	NMDAR	synapses	on	pyramidal	cells,	such	that	attractor	states	are	harder	to	sustain,	and	iii)	by	reducing	the	NMDAR	time	constant,	making	states	more	vulnerable	to	random	fluctuations	in	neural	activity.	See	also	similar	schematics	elsewhere	(Durstewitz	and	Seamans,	2008;	Rolls	et	al.,	2008).					
	
Figure	2:	Beads	task	schematic	and	group	average	confidence	ratings	in	
Datasets	1	and	2.			The	bottom	right	panel	is	an	illustrative	schematic	of	the	beads	task:	two	jars	containing	opposite	proportions	of	beads	are	concealed	from	view	and	a	subject	is	asked	to	rate	the	probability	of	either	jar	being	the	source	of	a	sequence	of	beads	he/she	is	viewing	(after	each	bead	in	turn).	The	top	left	panel	shows	the	mean	(±	standard	error)	confidence	ratings	in	the	blue	jar	over	the	10	bead	sequence	averaged	across	each	group	at	baseline	in	dataset	1.	The	bottom	left	panel	shows	the	same	quantities	at	follow-up	in	dataset	1.	The	top	right	panel	shows	these	quantities	in	four	10	bead	sequences	concatenated	together	(they	were	presented	to	the	subjects	separately	during	testing)	in	dataset	2.		
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Figure	3:	The	structure	of	the	Hierarchical	Gaussian	Filter	(Model	6)	and	
some	simulated	data		
	In	the	upper	left	panel,	the	evolution	of	μ2,	the	posterior	estimate	of	tendency	x2	towards	the	blue	(positive)	or	red	(negative)	jar,	is	plotted	over	two	concatenated	series	of	10	trials	(the	first	two	in	dataset	2).	The	estimate	of	the	tendency	on	trial	k+1,	,'(#0&),	is	selected	from	a	Gaussian	distribution	with	mean	,'(#)	(blue	line)	and	variance	:'(#) + exp	(?)	(blue	shading).	ω	is	a	static	source	of	variance	at	this	level.	The	initial	variance	:'(N)	(along	with	ω)	affects	the	size	of	initial	updates,	so	we	estimated	this	parameter	(which	is	often	fixed).	The	beads	seen	by	the	subjects,	u(k)	(blue	and	red	dots)	and	the	response	model	are	illustrated	in	the	bottom	left	panel.	The	response	model	maps	from	,̂&(#0&)	(purple	line)	–	the	prediction	of	x1	on	the	next	trial,	which	is	a	sigmoid	function	s	of	,'(#)	(or	of	-6&,'(#).	in	Models	5	and	6)	–	to	A(#),	the	subject’s	indicated	estimate	of	the	probability	the	jar	is	blue	(green	dots).	Variation	in	this	mapping	is	modelled	as	the	precision	ν	of	a	beta	distribution.		The	right	panel	is	a	schematic	representation	of	the	generative	model	in	Models	5	and	6	(i.e.	including	6&).	The	black	arrows	denote	the	probabilistic	network	on	trial	k;	the	grey	arrows	denote	the	network	at	other	points	in	time.	The	perceptual	model	lies	above	the	dotted	arrows,	and	the	response	model	below	them.	The	shaded	circles	are	known	quantities,	and	the	parameters	and	states	in	unshaded	circles	are	estimated.	The	dotted	line	represents	the	result	of	an	
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inferential	process	(the	response	model	builds	on	a	perceptual	model	inference);	the	solid	lines	are	generative	processes.		
Figure	4:	Simulated	data	illustrating	the	effects	of	φ	(Models	3	and	4)		
and	κ1	(Model	5	and	6)	on	inference	
	This	figure	illustrates	the	effects	of	φ	(used	in	Models	3	and	4)	and	κ1	(used	in	Models	5	and	6)	on	inference.	Both	panels	show	simulated	perceptual	model	predictions	in	the	same	format	as	before,	with	σ2(0)	and	ω	set	to	their	previous	values	–	hence	the	purple	line	in	these	plots	is	identical	to	that	in	Figure	3.	The	second	level	and	simulated	responses	y	have	been	omitted	for	clarity.		Upper	left	panel:	Simulations	of	a	perceptual	model	incorporating	an	autoregressive	order	(1)	process	at	the	second	level,	using	three	different	values	of	AR(1)	parameter	φ:	0,	0.2	and	0.8.	The	estimate	of	the	tendency	on	trial	k+1,	,'(#0&),	is	selected	from	a	Gaussian	distribution	with	mean	,'(#) + J(K − ,'(#))	and	variance	:'(#) + exp	(?).	Over	time,	μ2	is	therefore	attracted	towards	level	m	(fixed	to	0,	i.e.	at	σ(μ2)	=	0.5)	at	a	rate	determined	by	φ.	In	effect,	this	gives	the	model	a	‘disconfirmatory	bias’,	such	that	as	φ	increases,	σ(μ2)	is	pulled	further	away	from	a	belief	in	either	jar,	and	towards	0.5	(maximum	uncertainty	about	the	jars).		Lower	left	panel:	Simulations	of	a	perceptual	model	using	four	different	values	of	scaling	factor	κ1,	which	alters	the	sigmoid	transformation:	,̂&(#0&) = )(6& ∙ ,'(#)).	When	κ1	>	exp(0)	updating	is	greater	to	unexpected	evidence	and	lower	to	consistent	evidence;	when	κ1	<	exp(0)	the	reverse	is	true.	The	red	and	brown	
	 40	
lines	(κ1	>	exp(0))	illustrate	the	effects	of	increasingly	unstable	attractor	networks,	i.e.	switching	between	states	(jars)	becomes	more	likely	(a	concomitant	increase	in	vulnerability	to	noise,	i.e.	response	stochasticity,	is	not	shown).	The	green	line	(κ1	=	exp(-1))	illustrates	slower	updating	around	,̂&	=	0.5,	as	was	found	in	controls.	κ1	permits	a	greater	range	of	updating	patterns	than	φ	(the	green	and	brown	trajectories	in	the	lower	panel	cannot	be	produced	by	Model	4)	which	may	be	why	Model	6	can	fit	both	controls	and	Scz	groups	well.	Middle	panel:	This	plot	shows	the	effects	of	κ1	on	belief	updating,	as	a	function	of	the	initial	belief	,̂&	(σ2(0)	and	ω	were	set	to	1.5	and	-1	respectively,	as	in	Figure	5;	changing	these	parameters	does	not	qualitatively	alter	the	effects	of	κ1	shown	here).	For	values	of	κ1	<	exp(0)=1	(bottom	three	curves)	and	initial	beliefs	to	the	left	of	these	curves’	maxima	(i.e.	that	the	jar	is	probably	red),	relatively	small	increases	in	,̂&	are	made	if	one	blue	bead	(u	=	1)	is	observed,	such	that	the	subject	still	believes	the	jar	is	most	likely	red.	For	values	of	κ1	>	exp(0.5)	(top	two	curves),	observing	one	blue	bead	causes	such	a	large	update	for	all	but	the	most	certain	initial	beliefs	in	a	red	jar	that	the	subject’s	posterior	belief	is	that	the	jar	is	probably	blue.	These	subjects’	beliefs	are	no	longer	stable,	but	neither	can	they	reach	certainty:	only	tiny	updates	towards	1	are	possible	for	,̂& > 0.8.		Right	panel:	This	plot	illustrates	the	average	absolute	shifts	in	beliefs	on	observing	beads	of	either	colour.	This	‘vulnerability	to	updating’	is	highly	reminiscent	of	the	‘energy	state’	of	a	neural	network	model	(schematically	illustrated	in	Figure	1)	–	i.e.	in	low	energy	states,	less	updating	is	expected.	The	effect	of	increasing	κ1	is	to	convert	confident	beliefs	about	the	jar	(near	0	and	1)	from	low	to	high	‘energy	states’,	i.e.	to	make	them	much	more	unstable.		
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Figure	5:	Recovery	of	model	parameters	from	simulated	data	
	200	datasets	were	simulated	using	Model	6;	100	using	modal	parameter	values	for	the	control	group	(dataset	2)	and	100	using	modal	values	for	the	Scz	group	(also	dataset	2)	–	the	values	are	indicated	using	red	lines.	Both	used	settings	of	
σ2(0)	=	1.5,	ω	=	-1.	The	control	group	used	κ1	=	0.37	(i.e.	exp(-1))	and	ν	=	exp(3).	The	Scz	group	used	κ1	=	2.7	(i.e.	exp(1))	and	ν	=	exp(2).	Histograms	depicting	the	parameter	estimates	from	model	inversion	using	the	same	priors	as	were	employed	in	the	main	analysis	are	shown	above:	the	modal	control	and	Scz	simulation	results	are	in	the	upper	and	lower	rows	respectively.	
	
Figure	6:	Bayesian	model	selection	results	for	both	datasets.		The	left	panel	depicts	the	protected	exceedance	probabilities	for	the	six	models	in	each	 group	 in	 each	 dataset.	 The	 protected	 exceedance	 probability	 is	 the	probability	a	particular	model	is	more	likely	than	any	other	tested	model,	above	and	beyond	chance,	given	the	group	data	(Rigoux	et	al.,	2014).	Model	6	wins	in	all	groups	 in	 both	 datasets	 (upper	 row:	 controls,	 middle	 row:	 Scz,	 bottom	 row:	clinical	controls).	The	right	panel	depicts	the	model	likelihoods	for	the	six	models	in	each	group	in	each	dataset.	The	model	likelihood	is	the	probability	of	that	model	being	the	best	for	any	randomly	selected	subject	(Stephan	et	al.,	2009).	Model	4	is	a	clear	runner-up	in	the	psychotic	(Scz)	and	clinical	control	groups	at	baseline	in	dataset	1,	and	in	the	Scz	group	in	dataset	2.	
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Figure	7:	Probability	density	plots	for	Model	6	parameters	in	dataset	1.		The	distributions	of	parameter	values	for	σ2(0),	ω,	log(ν)	and	log(κ1)	are	plotted	for	dataset	1	at	baseline	(upper	row)	and	dataset	1	at	follow-up	(lower	row).	The	symbols	denote	significant	group	differences:	§	between	non-clinical	controls	and	clinical	controls,	*	between	non-clinical	controls	and	Scz,	†	between	Scz	and	clinical	controls.	Please	see	the	text	for	the	details	of	all	statistical	comparisons.		
Figure	8:	Model	6	parameters	in	dataset	2	–	distributions	and	correlation		Upper	panel:	The	distributions	of	parameter	values	for	σ2(0),	ω,	log(ν)	and	log(κ1)	are	plotted	for	dataset	2.	The	*	symbol	denotes	significant	group	differences	between	the	Scz	group	and	non-clinical	control	subgroup	(well-matched	in	age	and	sex);	the	group	difference	in	σ2(0)	is	not	indicated	because	it	was	non-significant	(p=0.056)	in	the	well-matched	comparison.	Please	see	the	text	for	the	details	of	all	statistical	comparisons.	Lower	panel:	The	significant	correlation	between	log(ν)	and	log(κ1)	in	dataset	2	is	plotted,	with	controls’	parameters	in	black	and	Scz	in	red.	Similar	correlations	were	also	found	in	dataset	1	at	both	time	points	(see	text).			
Figure	9:	Responses	and	model	fits	for	two	control	subjects		These	plots	show	two	control	subjects’	responses	to	four	ten-bead	sequences	concatenated	together,	in	the	same	format	as	Figure	3	(but	without	the	second	level,	due	to	space	constraints);	in	the	latter	two	sequences	blue	and	red	were	
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swapped	around	for	model-fitting	purposes.	Each	plot	shows	u(k)	–	the	beads	seen	by	the	subjects	on	trials	k	=1,…,10	(blue	and	red	dots),	y	–	the	subject’s	(Likert	scale)	response	about	the	probability	the	jar	is	blue	(green	dots),	and	,̂&(#0&)	–	the	model’s	estimate	of	the	subject’s	prediction	the	jar	is	blue	(purple	line).	The	parameter	estimates	for	each	subject	are	shown	above	their	graphs.	These	subjects	have	fairly	similar	initial	variance	σ2(0),	(inverse)	response	stochasticity	ν,	and	instability	factor	κ1.	Subject	18	in	the	upper	panel	has	a	much	lower	overall	evolution	rate	ω	than	Subject	67	in	the	lower	panel,	therefore	Subject	18	never	reaches	certainty	about	either	jar,	and	makes	relatively	small	changes	to	her	beliefs	in	response	to	beads	of	varying	colours.	Both	subjects	have	a	low	κ1,	and	so	they	make	relatively	small	adjustments	to	their	beliefs	following	unexpected	evidence	(this	behaviour	can	best	be	captured	by	the	models	containing	κ1	–	see	Figure	4).	Subject	18’s	responses	are	very	close	to	those	predicted	by	the	model,	and	this	is	reflected	in	her	relatively	high	value	of	ν.				
Figure	10:	Responses	and	model	fits	for	two	Scz	subjects		These	plots	show	two	Scz	subjects’	responses	to	four	ten-bead	sequences	in	the	same	format	as	Figure	9.	These	subjects	have	similar	evolution	rate	ω	to	the	control	subjects	in	Figure	9,	but	they	both	have	a	much	higher	κ1,	meaning	that	they	make	much	greater	changes	to	their	beliefs	when	presented	with	unexpected	evidence,	but	do	not	reach	certainty	when	faced	with	consistent	evidence.	Subject	122	(lower	panel)	has	a	slightly	higher	evolution	rate	ω	than	Subject	145	(upper	panel),	and	so	his	switching	between	jars	is	even	more	pronounced.	These	subjects	also	have	slightly	lower	(inverse)	response	
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stochasticity	ν	than	the	control	subjects	in	Figure	9,	and	so	their	responses	tend	to	be	further	from	the	model	predictions.					
Dataset	1		 	 	 	 	 	 	 Dataset	2		 	 	 	
	
Non-
clinical	
controls	
t1	
Non-
clinical	
controls	
t2	 Clinical	controls	t1	 Clinical	controls	t2	 Psychotic	t1	 Psychotic	t2	 	 Controls	(all)	 Scz	
	
Controls	
(subset)	
N	 35	 20	 22	 18	 23	 17	 N	 111	 56	 60	
Agea	 27.77	(6.74)	 27.9		(6.37)	 40.91	(13.57)	 40.1		(13)	 31.22	(7.28)	 29.9	(7.83)	 Age	 32.8	(11.5)	 45.3		(8.8)	 39.5	(11.4)	Gender	 18	M,		17	F	 12	M,		8	F	 11	M,		11	F	 8	M,		10	F	 21	M,		2	F		 17	M,		0	F	 Gender	 45	M,		66	F	 38	M,		18	F	 40	M,	20	F	
Cognitive	
measures	 		 	 		 	 		 		 	 	 		 	
IQb	 107.5	(11.6)	 108.6	(10.3)	 97.4		(13.8)	 99.8	(10.2)	 88.1		(12.7)	 87.8		(14.2)	 NARTa	 112		(6.9)	 109		(8.2)	 112		(7.5)	
	 		 	 		 	 		 		 Working	memory	(LNS)b	 16.2	(2.8)	 10.3	(4.2)	 	16.4	(2.7)	
Delusion	
proneness	 		 	 		 	 		 		 Schizotypy		 	 		 	
PDI	(total)c	 54.6	(43.1)	 43.6	(42.5)	 87.1		(55.2)	 64.3	(57.3)	 138.1	(74.2)	 96.7	(42.6)	 SPQ,	cognitive	 2.8	(1.9)	 4.0	(2.6)	 3.1(2)	
DSSId	 2.3	(4.9)	 2.9	(5.3)	 4.8	(4.5)	 4.5	(5.6)	 15.2	(6.3)	 8.1	(6.6)	 SPQ,	interpers	 3.2	(2.2)	 5.3	(2.6)	 3.2	(2.2)	
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	 		 	 		 	 		 		 SPQ,	disorg	 2.1	(1.7)	 2.7	(1.9)	 1.9	(1.8)	
	 		 	 		 	 		 		 SPQ,	totalc	 8.2	(1.3)	 12	(5.3)	 8.2	(4.4)	
Diagnosis/		
Symptoms	 		 	 		 	 		 		 	 	 		 	Diagnoses	
-	 -	
16	Depression,	3	anxiety	&	depression,						3	SAD	
12	Depression,	3	anxiety	&	depression,						3	SAD	
18	Scz,		5	bipolar/	schizo-affective	
13	Scz,		4	bipolar/	schizo-affective	
Diagnoses	
-	 56	Scz	
				-	
MS	affective	 -	 -	 4.6	(1.7)	 1.0	(1.2)	 1.8	(1.5)	 1.5	(1.3)	 PANSS,	gen	 -	 32.6	(9.2)	 -	
MS	positive	 -	 -	 0.3	(0.8)	 0	(0)	 6.0	(2.4)	 1.4	(1.7)	 PANSS,	pos	 -	 15.9	(5.8)	 -	
MS	negative	 -	 -	 0.7	(1.6)	 1.8	(3.19)	 1.3	(2.0)	 0.9	(1.6)	 PANSS,	neg	 -	 15.9	(6.2)	 -	
MS	totale	 -	 -	 5.5	(2.6)	 2.8	(3.39)	 9.1	(3.76)	 3.7	(3.9)	 PANSS,	total	 -	 64.4	(17.3)	 -	
Beads	task	 		 	 		 	 		 		 	 		 	 	Initial	certainty	(1	bead)f	 0.58	(0.15)	 0.59	(0.12)	 0.68		(0.19)	 0.63	(0.16)	 0.76	(0.17)	 0.68	(0.29)	 Initial	certainty	(all,	1	bead)d	 0.67	(0.13)	 0.71	(0.14)	 0.68	(0.14)	
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Initial	 certainty	(3	beads)g	 0.65	(0.14)	 0.67	(0.1)	 0.69	(0.15)	 0.64	(0.16)	 0.78	(0.15)	 0.74	(0.15)	 Initial	certainty	(all,	2-3	beads)e	 0.7	(0.12)	 0.71	(0.12)	 0.71	(0.13)	Disconfirmatory	updatingh	 -0.06	(0.14)	 -0.03	(0.13)	 -0.19	(0.3)	 -0.11	(0.22)	 -0.29	(0.33)	 -0.2	(0.3)	 Disconfirmatory	updating		(all	sequences)f	
-0.16	(0.17)	 -0.23	(0.22)	 -0.19	(0.2)	
Final	certaintyi	 0.85	(0.2)	 0.94	(0.11)	 0.82	(0.16)	 0.79	(0.23)	 0.88	(0.11)	 0.85	(0.23)	 Final	certainty	Sequence	Ag	 0.88	(0.16)	 0.77	(0.25)	 0.86	(0.18)	
	 		 	 		 	 		 		 Final	certainty	Sequence	Dh	 0.12	(0.18)	 0.25	(0.24)	 0.16	(0.2)		
Table	1:	Demographic,	psychological	and	behavioural	details	of	both	datasets	
	Dataset	1	includes	measures	at	both	baseline	(t1)	and	follow-up	(t2).	In	dataset	1,	verbal	IQ	was	estimated	using	the	Quick	Test	(Ammons	and	Ammons,	1962)	and	delusion	proneness	using	the	Peters	Delusion	Inventory,	PDI	(Peters	et	al.,	1999)	and	Delusions-Symptoms-States	Inventory,	DSSI	(Foulds	and	Bedford,	1975).	Symptoms	were	assessed	using	the	Manchester	Scale,	MS	(Krawiecka	et	al.,	1977).	In	the	tests	below,	‘Scz’	refers	to	the	whole	Psychotic	group.	Results	are	given	for	‘Initial	certainty’	using	both	the	measure	in	the	original	analysis	of	dataset	1	(Peters	and	Garety,	2006),	the	mean	response	to	the	first	three	beads	(‘3	beads’)	–	in	dataset	2	this	had	to	be	the	mean	response	to	the	first	three	beads	in	sequences	B	and	C	and	two	beads	in	sequences	A	and	D	(‘2-3	beads’)	–	and	using	the	response	to	the	first	bead	(‘1	bead’).					
a	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,77)	=	13.9,	p	=	10-5.	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	3.45,	p(adj)	=	0.35;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	13.1,	p(adj)	=	10-5;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	9.69,	p(adj)	=	0.002	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	8.85,	p	=	0.0005.	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	1.98,	p(adj)	=	0.8;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	12.2,	p(adj)	=	0.0006;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	10.2,	p(adj)	=	0.007	b	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,75)	=	16.2,	p	=	10-6;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	 -19.5,	p(adj)	=	 10-6;	Clinical	 vs	Non-clinical	 controls	 diff	 =	 -10.1,	p(adj)	=	 0.011;	 Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	9.36,	p(adj)	=	0.043	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,51)	=	14.5,	p	=	10-5;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	 -20.8,	 p(adj)	 =	 10-5;	 Clinical	 vs	 Non-clinical	 controls	 diff	 =	 -8.8,	 p(adj)	 =	 0.057;	 Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	12,	p(adj)	=	0.01	c	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,68)	=	12.6,	p	=	0.00002;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	83.5,	p(adj)	=	10-5;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-32.5,	p(adj)	=	0.094;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-51,	p(adj)	=	0.016	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	4,	p	=	0.024;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	53.1,	p(adj)	=	0.018;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-20.7,	p(adj)	=	0.5;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-32.4,	p(adj)	=	0.22	d	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,76)	=	43,	p	=	10-13;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	12.9,	p(adj)	=	10-10;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	2.52,	p(adj)	=	0.19;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-10.4,	p(adj)	=	10-8	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,51)	=	3.7,	p	=	0.032;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	5.2,	p(adj)	=	0.026;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	1.65,	p(adj)	=	0.66;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-3.56,	p(adj)	=	0.18	e	At	t1:	Welch’s	t(38.4)	=	-3.62,	p	=	0.00086,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.1	At	t2:	Welch’s	t(17.8)	=	-2.55,	p	=	0.02,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.0	f	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,77)	=	8.7,	p	=	0.0004;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	 =	 0.18,	 p(adj)	 =	 0.0003;	 Clinical	 vs	 Non-clinical	 controls	 diff	 =	 0.11,	 p	 =	 0.06;	 Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-0.08,	p(adj)	=	0.25	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	0.9,	p	=	0.4		g	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,77)	=	6.2,	p	=	0.003;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.14,	p(adj)	=	0.002;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	0.04,	p	=	0.57;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-0.096,	p(adj)	=	0.074	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	2.35,	p	=	0.11;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	0.07,	p(adj)	=	0.28;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.03,	p	=	0.8;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-0.1,	p(adj)	=	0.1	
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h	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,77)	=	6,	p	=	0.004;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.23,	p(adj)	=	0.003;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.14,	p	=	0.13;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	0.097,	p(adj)	=	0.41	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	2.9,	p	=	0.062;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.18,	p(adj)	=	0.049;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.08,	p	=	0.51;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	0.098,	p(adj)	=	0.4	i	At	t1:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,77)	=	0.71,	p	=	0.5	At	t2:	One-way	ANOVA	F(2,52)	=	2.79,	p	=	0.07;	Tukey’s	HSD:	Scz	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.082,	p(adj)	=	0.41;	Clinical	vs	Non-clinical	controls	diff	=	-0.15,	p	=	0.057;	Clinical	controls	vs	Scz	diff	=	-0.066,	p(adj)	=	0.57	As	reported	previously,	there	were	consistent	negative	correlations	between	initial	certainty	(2-3	 beads)	 and	 disconfirmatory	 updating	 in	 the	 clinical	 controls	 (baseline:	ρ	 =	 -0.68,	p	=	0.0005;	follow-up:	ρ	=	-0.75,	p	=	0.0003)	and	the	non-clinical	controls	(baseline:	ρ	=	-0.52,	p	=	0.001;	follow-up:	ρ	=	-0.43,	p	=	0.06),	but	not	in	the	psychotic	group	(baseline:	ρ	=	-0.30,	p	=	0.17;	follow-up:	ρ	=	0.17,	p	=	0.5).	There	was	no	consistent	correlation	between	final	certainty	and	either	of	the	other	two	measures	at	either	time	point	(p	≥	0.1	in	11	out	of	12	comparisons).	In	dataset	2,	IQ	was	estimated	using	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test,	NART	(Nelson,	1982)	and	working	memory	using	the	Letter	Number	Sequencing	task,	LNS,	from	the	Wechsler	Adult	Intelligence	 Scale-III	 (Wechsler,	 1997).	 Schizotypy	 was	 assessed	 using	 the	 Schizotypal	Personality	Questionnaire,	SPQ	(Raine,	1991),	and	symptoms	using	the	Positive	and	Negative	Syndrome	Scale,	PANSS	(Kay	et	al.,	1987).		As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	2	(main	text),	the	Scz	group	showed	greater	initial	certainty	(1	bead)	in	sequences	A	and	B	(Welch’s	t(94)	=	2.8,	p	=	0.007,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.47;	Welch’s	t(97)	=	3,	p	=	0.004,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.5,	respectively)	but	not	C	and	D	(Welch’s	t(87)	=	0.5,	p	=	0.6,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.09;	Welch’s	t(90)	=	-0.34,	p	=	0.73,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.06,	respectively).	a	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(95.1)	=	2.27,	p	=	0.026,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.38;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(111)	=	1.95,	p	=	0.053,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.36	b	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(81)	=	9.57,	p	=	10-14,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.66;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(93.6)	=	9.25,	p	=	10-15,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.73	c	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(92.4)	=	-4.64,	p	=	10-5,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.78;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(107)	=	-4.19,	p	=	10-5,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.78	d	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(110)	=	-1.9,	p	=	0.059,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.32;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(110)	=	-1.1,	p	=	0.28,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.2	e	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(109.1)	=	-0.76,	p	=	0.45,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.12;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(113.9)	=	-0.19,	p	=	0.85,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.03	f	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(88.2)	=	2.09,	p	=	0.04,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.36;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(110.4)	=	-0.94,	p	=	0.35,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.18	
	 50	
g	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(80.1)	=	2.99,	p	=	0.0038,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.56;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(98.7)	=	2.18,	p	=	0.032,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.41	h	Controls	(all):	Welch’s	t(85.5)	=	-3.41,	p	=	0.001,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.62;	Controls	(subset):	Welch’s	
t(106)	=	-2.21,	p	=	0.029,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.42					 			Model	
Perceptual	model	parameters	(prior	mean	in	native	space,	prior	variance	in	estimation	space)	 Response	model	parameter	Evolution	rate		 Initial	variance	of	belief	re	jars	 Disconfirmatory	bias	 Belief	instability	 Response	stochasticity	1	 ω	(-2,	16)	 	 	 	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)	2	 ω	(-2,	16)	 σ2(0)	(0.8,	0.5)	 	 	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)	3	 ω	(-2,	16)	 	 φ	(0.1,	2)	 	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)	4	 ω	(-2,	16)	 σ2(0)	(0.8,	0.5)	 φ	(0.1,	2)	 	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)	5	 ω	(-2,	16)	 	 	 κ1	(1,1)	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)	6	 ω	(-2,	16)	 σ2(0)	(0.8,	0.5)	 	 κ1	(1,1)	 ν	(exp(4.85),	1)		
Table	2:	Models,	parameters	and	their	prior	distributions.				 	 σ2(0)		 ω	 log(ν)	 log(κ1)	
Dataset	1	(baseline,	
n=80)		 	 	 	 	Non-clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 2.5(3.9)	 -1.3(2.4)	 4.1(1.0)	 -0.8(1.4)	Psychotic:	mean(std)	 3.0(3.9)	 -1.4(2.0)	 3.1(1.1)	 -0.2(0.8)	Clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 1.4(1.9)	 -1.2(2.0)	 3.3(1.3)	 -0.1(1.4)	Kruskal-Wallis	Chi	Sq	(2,80)	 2.33,	p=0.31	
η2=0.02	
0.22,	
p=0.9	
η2=0.0	
11.9,	
p=0.003	
η2=0.15	
9.6,	p=0.008	
η2=0.12	
Post	hoc	Dunn	tests		 	 	 	 	
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Psychotic	vs	non-clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.3	 p(adj)=1	 p(adj)=0.002	 p(adj)=0.01	Clinical	vs	non-clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.2	 p(adj)=0.7	 p(adj)=0.01	 p(adj)=0.01	Psychotic	vs	clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.2	 p(adj)=0.5	 p(adj)=0.3	 p(adj)=0.4	
Dataset	1	(follow-up,	
n=55)	 	 	 	 	Non-clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 2.8(3.4)	 -0.9(2.0)	 3.6(0.8)	 -1.2(1.1)	Psychotic:	mean(std)	 3.2(3.7)	 -1.4(1.5)	 2.5(1.2)	 -0.3(0.8)	Clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 1.2(0.9)	 -1.1(2.0)	 3.5(1.1)	 -0.5(1.4)	Kruskal-Wallis	Chi	Sq	(2,80)	 2.35,	p=0.3	η2=0.04	 2.32,	p=0.3	
η2=0.04	
8.5,	p=0.01	
η2=0.16	 8.0,	p=0.02	η2=0.15	
Post	hoc	Dunn	tests		 	 	 	 	Psychotic	vs	non-clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.4	 p(adj)=0.2	 p(adj)=0.01	 p(adj)=0.007	Clinical	vs	non-clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.2	 p(adj)=0.3	 p(adj)=0.5	 p(adj)=0.1	Psychotic	vs	clinical	controls	 p(adj)=0.3	 p(adj)=0.3	 p(adj)=0.01	 p(adj)=0.1	
Dataset	2	(n=167)	 	 	 	 	Non-clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 3.1(2.6)	 -2.3(2.0)	 2.8(1.0)	 -0.8(0.9)	Scz:	mean(std)	 1.9(1.5)	 -2.1(1.8)	 2.1(1.2)	 0.2(1.0)	Mann-Whitney	U	test		 Z=3.1,	
p=0.002,	
r=0.24	
Z=-0.6,	
p=0.6,	
r=0.04	
Z=3.9,	
p=0.0001,	
r=0.3	
Z=-5.6,	
p=3x10-8,	
r=0.43	
Dataset	2		 	 	 	 	
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(better-matched	
controls,	n=116)	Non-clinical	controls:	mean(std)	 2.8(2.7)	 -2.2(2.1)	 2.9(1.1)	 -0.6(1.0)	Scz:	mean(std)	 1.9(1.5)	 -2.1(1.8)	 2.1(1.2)	 0.2(1.0)	Mann-Whitney	U	test		 Z=1.9,	
p=0.056,	
r=0.18	
Z=0.12,	
p=0.9,	
r=0.01	
Z=3.4,	
p=0.0007,	
r=0.31	
Z=-4.1,	
p=0.00004,	
r=0.38		
Table	3:	Parameter	distributions	and	statistical	tests	in	Datasets	1	and	2			
